Corporate claims against directors or officers following the company’s unlawful conduct by WAN, Wai Yee
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law
2-2016
Corporate claims against directors or officers
following the company’s unlawful conduct
Wai Yee WAN
Singapore Management University, wywan@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research
Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, and the Business
Organizations Law Commons
This Conference Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at
Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
WAN, Wai Yee. Corporate claims against directors or officers following the company’s unlawful conduct. (2016). Critical Issues in
Corporate Law 2015, September 10, Hong Kong; Australian Corporate Law Teachers Association Conference 2016, February 1-2. 1-18.
Research Collection School Of Law.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/2541
 1 
 
SMU Classification: Restricted 
DRAFT 
1.3.15 
 
[Types of offences, strict versus fault based, due diligence defence] 
 
Rethinking Loss-Shifting Civil Claims following the Company’s Unlawful Conduct  
 
Wai Yee Wan 
Associate Professor 
Singapore Management University 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
When a company enters into a transaction or undertakes an action that turns out to be 
either illegal or otherwise exposes the company to substantial fines or other pecuniary sanctions, 
the question arises as to whether the company may then recover its fines, expenses and other 
losses from its directors and employees, in the absence of the relevant legislation specifically 
providing for, or denying a claim by, the company. 1 In these cases, the board may have made a 
specific decision to cause the company to enter into the unlawful conduct or may have failed to 
prevent the improper conduct from undertaken by its employees or officers acting on the 
company’s behalf. This paper assumes that the directors or employees have not acted dishonestly 
or otherwise breach the no-conflict or no-profit rule. While the board is not likely to sue one of 
its own members, the action may be brought by a differently constituted board2 or shareholders 
pursuant to the statutory derivative action.3  
 
While there are few criminal prosecutions of companies, particularly for economic 
crimes, this is likely going to change with the introduction of the deferred prosecution 
agreements via the Crime and Courts Act 2013, and the proposed increase in fines for fraud, 
bribery and money laundering offences on companies will result in the issue becoming even 
more important.4 Loss-shifting claims by the company against the directors or officers present 
several difficult policy issues. The company has the incentives to make the claim as it will 
                                                 
1  For examples of a civil remedy being made statutorily available to a company against the director under the 
Companies Act 2006, see the following: (1) Section 463(2), a company can make a claim against directors for 
compensation for any loss it suffers as a result of any untrue or misleading statement in the directors’ report; and (2) 
under sections 580(2) and 593(3), a company can make a claim against an allottee of shares in the situation in which 
it will have committed a criminal offence by allotting them to him. 
2  For example, see Safeway. 
3  For an example of a corporate action by a company against its former directors and employees, see Safeway 
Stores v Twigger. 
4  See Sentencing Council, Fraud, bribery and money laundering: corporate offenders: Definitive Guideline; 
the Sentencing Council (“Sentencing Guidelines”).   The Sentencing Council has adopted a similar methodology to 
that currently used by the UK Financial Conduct Authority which determines the starting figure from a percentage 
of the ‘relevant revenue’ derived from the alleged conduct. The financial risk to companies is increased by the 
multipliers which will be applied to this base figure in order to determine the final penalty. The Definitive 
Guidelines recommend a multiplier of as much as 400 per cent in the most egregious cases. 
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generally not be able to claim the fine/penalty from its own insurer,5 and may wish to have 
recourse against its directors or employees for negligence or breach of duty of care, particularly 
if they are covered by directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance. However, in principle, it appears 
surprising if the impact of a criminal sanction could be negated by a civil claim. Yet, 
shareholders or creditors (where the company is insolvent) may not have participated in the 
wrongdoing at all and it appears harsh that the company is denied the claim from its directors.  
 
While the most recent discussions of the point of illegality by the House of Lords in Gray 
v Thames Trains6 and Stone & Rolls are largely inconclusive, the recent decisions of the Court of 
Appeal in Safeway v Twigger7(Safeway)  and Bilta (No. 2) v Nazir8 (Bilta) highlight the policy 
debates in this area. In Safeway, which concerns the infringement of the Chapter I prohibition of 
the Competition Act 1998, the Court of Appeal held that the claims by the company against its 
directors and employees for the fine/penalty and associated expenses were barred because they 
infringed the public policy maxim ex turpi causa that a person committed an illegal or unlawful 
act could not maintain an action for an indemnity against the liability which resulted from the 
act. Much of the reasoning of the Court of Appeal will apply to other kinds of corporate criminal 
or quasi-criminal wrongdoing.  In Bilta, Safeway was distinguished on the grounds of [ ]. 
 
However, a number of questions remain. First, would public policy prohibition the 
recovery of fines/penalties against the director or employee in respect of a strict liability offence 
or an offence which carry strict liability but where the defendant has a defence of due diligence? 
Safeway was a case concerning fault-based quasi-criminal liability for the corporate wrongdoing, 
and the case left open the possibility of claims in respect of strict liability offences. Second, 
would the same prohibition barring claims apply to losses payable by the company as result of 
court-ordered compensation orders which form part of the settlement of the quasi-criminal 
prosecution or deferred prosecution agreement? These are not technically fines or penalties. 
Third, would the prohibition on recovery extend to losses suffered by the company in 
conjunction with the wrongdoing?  
 
Part II deals with the scope of the public policy bar as set out in Safeway and the existing 
case law in respect of loss-shifting by the company in respect of recovery of fines/penalties and 
other losses. It argues that notwithstanding Safeway v Twigger, English case law draws a clear 
distinction between fines/penalties and other losses; the case law shows that the courts should be 
very slow to find the existence of a public policy bar in the latter.  
 
Part III argues that contrary to academic arguments, the prohibition on the company’s 
ability shifting losses arising from the fines or penalties can be justified conceptually not only on 
criminal law principles, but also on corporate law principles. While the prohibition in Safeway 
may be inconsistent with the policy of enforcing directors’ duties, allowing such compensation 
claims by the companies for the penalties fines paid over to the regulator will also lead to other 
                                                 
5  FSA Handbook, GEN 6.1.5: "No firm may enter into, arrange, claim on or make a payment under a 
contract of insurance that is intended to have, or has or would have, the effect of indemnifying any person against 
all or part of a financial penalty" 
6 [2009] UKHL33. 
7  [2010] EWCA Civ 1472. 
8  [2013] EWCA Civ 968; [2014] Ch 52. 
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issues, such as resulting in a windfall for the companies who may have benefitted from the 
criminal wrongdoing in other aspects, and loss-shifting may even disincentivise companies to 
take appropriate preventive measures to avoid the occurrence of corporate wrongdoing. 
 
However, the public policy prohibition in respect of claims based on the company’s 
fines/penalties does not apply with equal force with the company’s civil claims. Using examples 
of possible civil claims arising from criminal prosecutions or quasi-criminal prosecutions of 
corporations will be drawn from the following key pieces of legislation: section 7 of Bribery Act 
2000, Proceeds of Crimes Act, Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, and employment and 
workplace legislation. Part III argues that the prohibition should not bar the company from 
recovering from its errant directors other kinds of losses. It draws the distinction between 
fines/penalties and compensation, noting that the distinction may not be so clear in instances 
where compensation orders are part of the fines/penalties. Using examples under the Proceeds of 
Crimes Act, [ ].  
 
Part IV compares the UK approach with the approaches in Australia and Singapore, as to 
the issues arising from loss-shifting in corporate wrongdoing actions. In the case of Australia, 
while Australia has a similar prohibition to UK in respect of barring recovery of fines/penalties, 
enforcement actions continue to be taken against directors for breach of their duty of care and 
skill in connection with corporate wrongdoing due to its active public enforcement regime by 
ASIC. In the case of Singapore, the issue of whether a company may bring an action against its 
former chief executive officer for bribes paid by the company to third parties (and which the 
CEO did not benefit personally) arose in Ho v Scintronix.   
 
The comparison shows that while current arrangements may not be optimal, there are 
good reasons for not allowing loss-shifting by companies against their directors following from 
corporate criminal prosecutions. Part V concludes.  
 
II. OVERVIEW AND RATIONALE OF THE EX TURPI CAUSA RULE 
 
A. The decisions in Safeway and Bilta  
 
In Safeway, the directors and employees of Safeway brought an application to strike out 
the claims from Safeway, which had sued them for an indemnity, for having caused it to be liable 
for substantial penalties potentially imposed for infringing Chapter I prohibition of the 
Competition Act 1998. The directors and employees had allegedly engaged in price-fixing with 
their counterparts in other supermarkets to increase the price of the dairy products, causing the 
company to breach the Competition Act 1998. Safeway entered into an early resolution 
agreement with the Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”), a form of settlement under which they 
admitted liability and agreed to pay a reduced penalty. The early resolution agreement between 
Safeway and OFT provided for Safeway to pay a fine of £16.5 million, to be reduced to £10.7 
million, provided Safeway continued to co-operate with the investigations. Safeway sued the 
defendants, alleging that they had breached their employment contracts, fiduciary duties and/or 
were liable in tort of negligence. 
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At first instance, Flaux J held that the infringement of Chapter I prohibition was 
sufficiently morally reprehensible to engage the ex turpi causa rule. The rule may include not 
only criminal conduct but also quasi-criminal conduct, including anti-competitive acts in breach 
of the Chapter I prohibition in the Competition Act. Three reasons were given: first, the 
agreement made in breach of the prohibition was illegal and a party to the agreement cannot 
claim damages for losses caused by being a party to the illegal agreement.9 Second, the 
infringement proceedings brought by OFT were regarded by case law as quasi-criminal in 
nature.10 Third, the fine imposed by the OFT had characteristics of a criminal fine, whose 
purpose is to punish or deter, rather than compensation, and the penalty is paid into the 
consolidated fund.  
 
However, Flaux J held that the wrongful acts that were committed by the defendants were 
attributed to Safeway by virtue of the general law of agency and the ex turpi causa was not a 
defence to the claim. On appeal, the finding of the seriousness of the infringement to engage the 
ex turpi causa rule was not challenged but the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding 
that the penalties incurred by Safeway were personal to the company, as opposed to merely 
vicarious, because section 36 of the Competition Act 1998 only imposed liability on the 
undertaking. As the liability was personal, it was contrary to public policy to allow the 
company’s claims.  
 
In reaching the decision, the Court of Appeal referred to Gray v Thames Trains, where 
Lord Hoffman explained that the ex turpi causa principles takes two forms. In the wider form, 
the rule prohibits the claimant from recovering compensation for loss which was suffered in 
consequence of its own criminal act. In its narrower form, the claimant cannot recover for 
damages which flows from the fine or other punishment imposed as a consequence of the 
unlawful act. The justification for both forms of the rule lies primarily on the ground of 
consistency, that is, it is inconsistent for a claimant to be personally liable to pay penalties but at 
the same time argues in a civil court that he is not answerable for that conduct.  
 
According to the Court of Appeal, Safeway concerns both the wide and narrow forms of 
the rule, because the claims were for losses arising from the fine (being the sentence imposed as 
consequence of entering into the illegal agreement) and the costs associated with the OFT 
regulatory proceedings (which were the consequences of entering into the illegal agreement). 
Part II will deal with the narrow form of the rule, that is, for losses arising from the fine.11 The 
consistency rationale barred the company’s civil claims for the fines and the costs. In particular, 
Pill LJ held that the policy of the Competition Act 1998 was to attribute liability only to the 
undertaking (in this case, Safeway) and to place the impetus on the undertaking to take 
preventive measures. Allowing the company to claim from the directors (and hence, indirectly, 
D&O policy) would undermine the policy behind imposing personal (as opposed to vicarious 
liability) on the company.12  
                                                 
9  E.g. Courage v Crehan (Case C-453/99) [2001] ECR I-6257. 
10  R v Office of Fair Trading [2009] EWHC 1875 (Admin); [2009] UKCLR 895. 
11  Part III will deal with the wide form of the rule. 
12  See Safeway Stores v Twigger, para 44: 
“The policy of the [Competition Act 1998] is to protect the public and to do so by imposing obligations on 
the undertaking specifically. The policy of the statute would be undermined if undertakings were able to 
 5 
 
SMU Classification: Restricted 
 
Safeway argued that it was a victim of fraud and was entitled to rely on the Re 
Hampshire principle,13 which prevents the attribution of acts of the agent to principal where the 
agent commits fraud on the principal. The Court of Appeal rejected the argument, on the ground 
that invoking the Re Hampshire principle will offend the consistency principles.  
 
Discuss Bilta. 
 
B. RATIONALE FOR THE LIMITATION AS TO RECOVERY OF 
FINES/PENALTIES 
 
Safeway has been criticized on a number of grounds.14  Contrary to academic 
commentators, it is argued that the prohibition on recovery of fines/penalties can be defended on 
both criminal law and corporate law principles.  
 
1. Criminal law: justifications based on consistency 
 
In Safeway, the Court of Appeal highlighted the need for consistency in the result in 
criminal and civil law and it would be inconsistent with the policy of the Competition Act 1998, 
which imposes liability on the undertaking, to then recover the penalties from its directors and 
employees. The decision has been criticised on the ground that it is anomalous that the culpable 
directors or employees do not bear the consequences of criminal conduct which is carried out by 
corporation and it is ultimately the innocent shareholders or creditors who will be penalised;15 it 
has also been similarly argued that actions against the directors and employees are not passing 
the liability, but suing them who have caused the liability in the first place.16 
 
Two points may be made. First, loss-shifting is generally contrary to the orthodox view 
based on the deterrent policy of the statute imposing criminal liability, irrespective of whether 
the claimant is a corporation. In R v Reliable Advertising and Addressing Agency17 and Askey v 
Golden Wine Co,18 both cases cited in Safeway, it was held that the civil courts will not allow 
criminal penalties in civil actions. Both of these cases involve negligence on the part of the 
claimants; in R v Reliable Advertising and Addressing Agency, the defendants failed to take 
                                                                                                                                                             
pass on the liability to their employees, or the employees' D & O insurers. Only if the undertaking itself 
bears the responsibilities, and meets the consequences of their non-observance, are the public protected. A 
deterrent effect is contemplated and the obligation to provide effective preventative measures is upon the 
undertaking itself.” 
13  [1896] 2 Ch 743.  
14  See E Lim, “The Illegality Defence and Company Law” (2013) 13 JCLS 49; P Watts, “Illegality and agency 
law: authorising illegal action” (2011) JBL 213. 
15  Eg see Lim, “A critique of corporate attribution: "directing mind and will" and corporate 
Objectives” (2013) JBL 333. 
16  See P Watts, “Illegality and agency law: authorising illegal action” (2011) JBL 213, at 220. 
17  [1915] 1 KB 652. Cf Cointat v Myham & Sons [1913] 2 KB 220 (the defendants sold the claimant butcher a 
pig which had tuberculous and the claimant was not aware of the state of meat. The inspector seized the meat and 
the claimant was convicted and fined; the claimant claimed the fine, and costs, for having bad meat in his premises 
and could recover from the defendant. This offence was one of strict liability.  
18  [1948] 2 All ER 35. 
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sufficient precautions for their clients, certain money-lenders, to ensure that advertising circulars 
were not circulated to minors, which was a criminal offence. The money-lenders, who were 
fined, claimed unsuccessfully against the defendants the fine and costs involved. The court made 
it clear that the same reasoning would apply, even if liability is strict. Likewise, in Askey v 
Golden Wine Co, the claimants, sellers of spirits which was unfit for human consumption, failed 
to claim the value of its fines, costs and other damages, from its suppliers. Denning J held that 
that it was against public policy to allow the offender to recover the fines and costs as the 
criminal offence was imposed to make the claimants more careful in their dealings with the 
suppliers.19  
 
Accordingly, where the board of the company has directed an act which is illegal (for 
example, directing the company to pay an illegal bribe), the company should not be able to claim 
its fine/penalties from the directors who have given such direction on policy grounds. If the 
legislation has imposed duties on the company to take reasonable due diligence in order to avoid 
falling foul of the prohibition on paying bribes, such as section 7 of the Bribery Act 2000, any 
attempt to remove the sting of liability or consequently, the duty to make the requisite 
investigation, and should be resisted.    
     
Second, the theory that there is an innocent corporation (with innocent shareholders or 
creditors) and culpable directors is not the only theory of corporate criminal liability. Under the 
theory of aggregation,20 the company is more than the sum of its parts; while a director may not 
be said to be negligent himself, two or more directors or employees can be shown collectively to 
have been negligent and whose conduct can be criticised. While a frequently cited example of 
corporate criminal liability being based on organizational ground is the Corporate Manslaughter 
and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, 21 the concept can be extended to other kinds of corporate 
wrongdoing that is dependent on fault or negligence, including the breach of the prohibition of 
Phase 1 of the Competition Act 1998. If the theory of aggregation is accepted, corporate criminal 
liability is imposed on the corporation if certain stakeholders of the corporation (including the 
directors and employees) commit offences in pursuit of the corporation’s goal.  
 
The Sentencing Guidelines, imposed by the Sentencing Council on Fraud, Bribery and 
Money Laundering: Corporate Offenders, which impose the guidelines on fines for economic 
crimes committed by organisations, have held that one of the underlying principles of drafting 
the guidelines is that there must be real economic impact on the corporate offender, including on 
                                                 
19  Denning J (at 380) held that the court must have regard “to the necessity for deterring him and others 
from doing the same thing again, to reform him, and, in cases such as the present, to make him and others more 
careful in their dealings”.   
20  The theory of aggravation was discussed by Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (1993) 132-3.  
21  See Law Commission, Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts (Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 
195 (2010) at para 5.92. Under the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, the company is not 
liable for corporate manslaughter if it causes a person’s death as a consequence of a gross breach of a relevant 
duty of care, being established if the conduct of the organization falls far below what can reasonably be expected 
in the circumstances, including the conduct of the workforce, its safety policies and practice of the company. 
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the shareholders.22 In fact, in adjusting the level of fine, the impact of fine on the shareholders is 
expressly not regarded as a factor.23 The premise must be on the basis that the shareholders take 
the risks and rewards of financing the company, which may have benefitted from the corporate 
wrongdoing.  
 
 
2. Corporate law and economic justifications 
 
Section 232(2) of the Companies Act 2006 sets out the general prohibition on the 
indemnification of directors against any liability attaching in connection with negligence, 
default, breach of duty or breach of trust in relation to the company, rendering such purported 
indemnification to be void. However, section 234 provides that indemnification in respect of 
third party claims is allowed, except in respect of criminal penalties, penalties imposed by 
regulatory bodies, costs incurred in defending criminal proceedings in which he is convicted and 
costs incurred by the director in defending civil proceedings brought by the company in which 
final judgement is given.   
 
Thus, the company legislation recognises that was that a director cannot be indemnified 
by the company in respect of criminal penalties or quasi-criminal penalties as well as the costs in 
defending criminal proceedings.24 This prohibition on indemnification is not dependent on 
whether the director is acting in good faith. The prohibition also does not depend on whether the 
director is convicted of an offence or quasi-offence that is fault-based. The basis must be that the 
allocation of penalties in criminal proceedings is in fact appropriate and that penalties imposed 
on a director should be borne by the director (with no possibility of recourse to the company). It 
would give rise to an anomalous situation where the company can hold the directors and 
employees liable for the fines/penalties incurred by the company but yet the directors cannot 
hold the companies responsible in respect of their own individual fines or penalties, 
notwithstanding the fact that they could have been acting what they perceive to be in the interests 
of the company.   
 
Further, there may be good reasons to disallow shifting of losses by the company to its 
directors/employees and require the company to bear the fine/penalty. It has been argued by 
Professor Kraakman that unlike the situation where directors and employees have breached the 
no-conflict or no-profit rule, economic theory favours imposing criminal fines (or civil liability) 
on the enterprise alone and personal liability is only appropriate where enterprise liability fails. 
The reason is that the managers’ actions which constitute the offences have been taken to benefit 
the enterprise. Large fines will reduce the enterprise earnings and therefore managerial rewards 
and shareholder pressure and reputational effect will have a bearing on corporate behaviour.25 
While the empirical evidence of such effect on UK companies is limited, if the enterprise is able 
                                                 
22  Sentencing Council, Fraud, Bribery and Money Laundering: Corporate Offenders: Definitive Guideline, 
effective from 1 October 2014. See Consultation Paper, Fraud, Bribery and Money Laundering: Corporate Offenders: 
Response to Consultation (January 2014). 
23  See above, p 8. 
24  It appears that s 243 does not prohibit the indemnification of costs unsuccessfully defending the 
regulatory proceedings.  
25  See R Kraakman, “Corporate Liability Strategies and Costs of Legal Controls” (1983) 93 Yale LJ 857 at 866. 
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to shift the losses away from the enterprise, it certainly encourages moral hazard. After the risks 
are transferred, the enterprise has less incentives to maintain high levels of are to avoid the 
situation from arising in the first place   
 
If the purpose of allowing the company to recover compensation in respect of fines or 
penalties incurred that are brought about by the conduct of the directors or the employees, there 
is another objection based on compensation principles. The recovery of the fine/penalty may give 
the company a windfall since the company would have benefitted from the criminal conduct or 
from the internal lack of oversight that allows the criminal conduct to occur. The examples of 
benefits may include direct benefit (such as obtaining a contract by reason of payment of a bribe 
or engaging in price-fixing) or avoidance of monitoring costs in ensuring that the circumstances 
do not arise. If the fine/penalty is not substantial and is less than the benefits that the company 
may have derived from the activity, then allowing the company to recover the fine will over-
compensate the company. While it may be argued that the fines that are recoverable by the 
company would need to take into account the benefits received in respect of the illicit conduct, 
this means that the court will have to carry out the exercise of evaluating whether the benefits 
exceed the fines/penalties involved.  Courts have declined to undertake such exercise. In ASIC v 
Cassimati,26 the court held that it was against public policy if the directors are allowed to weigh 
the benefits of deliberately breaching a legislative provision versus the penalties that are 
involved. 
 
C. Should the ex turpi causa rule prohibit recovery of fines/penalties in strict 
liability offences? 
 
In Safeway, the Court of Appeal left open the question of whether the same result should 
be reached if the offence is one of strict liability. In an earlier decision of Osman v J Ralph Moss 
Ltd, the Court of Appeal held that the claimant, who had been told by the insurance agents that 
he was insured against motor vehicle accidents, when his insurance had lapsed, successfully 
recovered against his agents the fine. Askey was distinguished on the ground that the claimant 
was free of culpable negligence.   
 
However, a subsequent case has confined Osman to its narrow facts, which applies only 
where there is absolutely no fault on the part of the claimant. In R v Northumbrian Water, ex 
parte Newcastle, 27 Collins J held that the health authority could not give an indemnity in respect 
of criminal charges under s 70 of the Water Industry Act 1991 (UK), which made it an offence to 
supply water that was unfit for human consumption; this was a strict liability offence but the 
defendant could avail himself of the defence of due diligence. Osman was confined only to the 
situation where “there is true liability and no conceivable fault (for want of a better word) on the 
part of the officer”; an offence under s 70 was not such a case because there was the defence of 
due diligence. Such offences will be rare, because legislation often imposes strict liability subject 
to a defence of due diligence. For example, section 7 of the Bribery Act provides that a 
commercial organisation will be liable to prosecution if a person associated with it bribes another 
person intending to obtain or retain business or an advantage in the conduct of business for that 
organisation. The commercial organisation will have a full defence if it can show that despite a 
                                                 
26  [2013] FCA 641. 
27  [1999] Env LR 175 at 726. 
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particular case of bribery it nevertheless had adequate procedures in place to prevent persons 
associated with it from bribing. 
 
Accordingly, it could be argued that the prohibition on bringing claims by the company 
against its director or employee should apply irrespective of whether the application of the 
fine/penalty depends on a finding of intention or negligence. Even where the offence is one of 
strict liability, the threat of the fine/penalty is to incentivise the taking of reasonable precautions 
to minimise the risk that the circumstances giving rise to liability will occur, and hence should be 
barred.28 The only time where the prohibition does not apply is a case of an absolute offence 
without any defence of due diligence. 
 
 
 
III. DISTINCTION BETWEEN CORPORATE FINES/PENALTIES AND OTHER 
LOSSES (WIDE VERSUS NARROW VERSIONS OF THE RULE) 
 
Part III addresses the question as to whether recovery of losses which are not 
fines/penalties should similarly be prohibited on the consistency ground. Prior to Safeway, the 
consistency rationale for barring claims based on illegality was also used in an earlier House of 
Lords’ decision in Stone and Rolls v Moore Stephens, a case which involved the wide form of the 
ex turpi causa rule. In that case, the liquidators of an insolvent company sued the auditors, who 
sought to rely on the defence of ex turpi causa, to prevent the company from recovering 
damages, in circumstances where the losses of the company was the result of the fraud of its sole 
director cum shareholder. The House of Lords held, by a majority of three to two, that the claim 
was barred by ex turpi causa. The basis of the majority decision was that it was a one-man firm 
and there were no innocent participants in the company, and that the fraud of the director-cum-
shareholder would be attributed to the company. In these circumstances, the company in Stone 
and Rolls could not rely on the Re Hampshire principle,29 which prevents the attribution of acts 
of the agent to principal where the agent commits fraud on the principal, to say it was not truly 
liable.  
 
In Stone and Rolls, the auditors conceded that if the company had sued the director-cum-
shareholder for breaching his duties to the company for misfeasance arising from wrongful 
trading, the claim would be barred by ex turpi causa on the ground that the directing mind and 
will would be attributable to the company.30 The majority left open the question as to whether 
the claim by the company against the auditor or director would have been barred if the company 
had independent shareholders who were unaware of the fraud by the directing mind and will. 
Lords Walker and Browne (two of the judges in the majority) decided the case on the fact that 
the company as a one-man firm, whose sole directing mind and will was solely responsible for 
the fraud, and there were no innocent participants. Lord Phillips (the third judge in the majority) 
                                                 
28  See Herzfeld, “Still a troublesome area: legislative and common law restrictions on indemnity and 
insurance arrangements effected by companies on behalf of officers and employees” (2009) 27 C&SLJ 26. 
29  [1896] 2 Ch 743.  
30  Para 29. This concession may be open to question because the company is insolvent, the creditors of the 
company will be the ones who are prejudiced by the defence, rather than the sole shareholder of the company.  
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alluded to the question, which was also left unanswered, as to whether the same conclusion 
would be reached where the company tried to recover compensation from a director.31   
 
In Safeway, the Court of Appeal took the approach that the costs associated with the OFT 
investigations were not recoverable by the company against the director. Referring to Stone and 
Rolls, it was held that the consistency argument barred such claims as well. 
 
A. Case law on recovery against director for misfeasance consequent upon criminal 
conduct  
 
The problem is that Safeway is hard to reconcile the earlier cases relating to the 
company’s ability to recover against the director monies or property that were illegally 
transferred by the company to third parties, on the basis of misfeasance (but not amounting to 
breach of the no-conflict or no-profit rule). For example, in Belmont Finance v Williams 
Furniture (No. 2),32G and his associates sold their shares in M to Belmont, a subsidiary of City, 
for £500,000, and G and his associates proceeded to purchase the shares in Belmont from City 
for £489,000. J was the directing mind of Belmont and City. Prior to executing the agreement for 
the sale and purchase of M shares, G had obtained counsel’s opinion that the transaction did not 
contravene section 48 of the Companies Act 1948,33 and the opinion was subsequently shown to 
the directors of Belmont and City (though the opinion was obtained by G did not make any 
reference to Belmont nor was it obtained on Belmont’s behalf).  
 
When Belmont went into liquidation, its liquidators sued City and the directors of 
Belmont, for the repayment of £489,000. Their case was that these shares in M were worth only 
£60,000, and that Belmont provided prohibited financial assistance to its purchasers for the 
acquisition of its shares, in contravention of the Companies Act 1948. The Court of Appeal 
found that the counsel’s opinion was erroneous and while J and the other Belmont directors fell 
short of their duty of care, they were not dishonest. J believed that the transaction was in the 
interests of Belmont and that M shares were worth £500,000. However, as the Belmont directors 
was aware of the circumstances giving rise to the transaction, including the fact that the purpose 
of the transaction was for G and his associates to acquire Belmont at no cost to themselves, it is 
not a transaction in the ordinary course of business and M was not an asset that Belmont 
genuinely needed, J and the other Belmont directors had committed misfeasance and breach of 
trust by misapplying the £489,000.34  
 
Additionally, two modern cases relating to the prohibition on financial assistance may 
also be instructive, even though the whitewash exception is abolished by the UK Companies Act 
2006. Cooks v Green,35 and Re A Flap Envelop Limited,36 each involves a company which 
undertakes a whitewash waiver in connection with the use of its (the company’s) assets to 
finance the sale of the shares of the company, which would otherwise be in breach of statutory 
                                                 
31  Paras 59 to 61. 
32  [1980] 1 All ER 393. 
33  This was the predecessor to section 678 of the Companies Act 2006; the prohibition in Companies Act 
1948 applied to private companies. 
34  [1979] 1 Ch 250 at 271. 
35  [2009] B.C.C. 204 
36  [2004] 1 BCLC 64. 
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prohibition on financial assistance. In both cases, the directors failed to make the relevant 
inquiries, with the result that there were material errors in the statutory declaration that the 
company would be solvent after the financial assistance. The auditors did not also carry out the 
necessary checks when they issued the auditors’ certificate in connection with the whitewash. 
The directors were held to be liable to the company in negligence for causing the company to 
provide illegal financial assistance.  
 
Likewise, Safeway is also not consistent with the cases involving recovery by the 
company of assets or property unlawfully transferred by the director. Where the transfer of assets 
or property is unlawful, such transfer will be unauthorised since no board can authorise an 
unlawful transfer. In Holland, by way of dicta,37 Lord Hope noted that there are two lines of case 
authority as to the nature of director’s liability to the company in respect of misapplication of the 
company’s assets.38 In the first line of authority, the directors are strictly liable, subject to the 
possibility of statutory relief under section 1157 of the Companies Act 2006 if he has acted 
honestly and reasonably and the court decides that he ought fairly to be excused.39 In the second 
line of authority, the director is only liable if he knew or ought to have known of the 
misapplication.40 Even though it was unnecessary to express a concluded view on this issue, 
Lord Hope preferred the strict liability approach.41 It is outside the scope of this article to discuss 
the merits of either approach, except to say that case clearly allows recovery for property 
transferred in breach of the capital maintenance rules.42 
 
Likewise, in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Richmond, Re Loquitur,43 the directors 
of a company authorised the payment of certain dividends but failed to provide for tax on the 
sale of its business, with the consequence that the company did not actually have the profits to 
make such payment. The Commissioner of Inland Revenue, as creditors, sought an order for the 
directors to repay the unlawful dividend on the ground of misfeasance or breach of duty. The 
directors argued that they had sought the advice of several professional advisers, including the 
company’s tax counsel, solicitors and accountants, and reasonably formed the view that they 
                                                 
37  The Supreme Court held that the defendant, Holland, was not a de facto director of the companies involved 
and hence was not subject to fiduciary duties.  
38  If the director is also a shareholder receiving the dividend, he will be liable to repay the dividend if knows 
or has reasonable grounds to believe that the dividend is unlawful under the Companies Act 2006: see Companies 
Act 2006, s 847. However the provision is silent on the liability of a director qua director. 
39 Eg Re Exchange Banking Co, Flitcroft’s Case (1882) 21 Ch D 519. See Re Kirkbys Coaches Ltd [1991] 
BCC 130, Hoffmann J at 131;  Bairstow and Others v Queens Moat Houses plc [2001] 2 BCLC 531; Re In a Flap 
Envelope Co Ltd (in Liq) [2003] BCC 487. 
40  Eg City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] Ch 407, per Romer LJ at 426. 
41  See Holland v HRMC [2010] UKSC 51 at [46] “The trend of modern authority supports the view that a 
director who causes a misapplication of a company's assets is in principle strictly liable to make good the 
misapplication, subject to his right to make good, if he can, a claim to relief under section 727 CA 1985. The 
authorities that favour the contrary view really come to an end with Dovey v Cory [1901] AC 477, as the later 
judgment of Romer J in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] Ch 407 can be read, at least in relation to 
dividends, as supporting strict liability. Furthermore, the whole point of introducing the right to claim relief under 
section 727 was to enable the court to mitigate the potentially harsh effect of being held strictly liable. That relief 
was introduced by section 32 of the Companies Act 1907, so it was not available when most of the cases in this line 
of authority were being decided.” That was also the opinion of Lord Walker ([124]) and Lord Clarke ([146]).  
42  See also Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock (No. 3) [1968] 1 WLR 1555 (on liability by the 
director to restore the misapplied assets of the company, which is akin to that of a trustee). 
43  [2003] EWHC 999. 
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were entitled not to provide for tax because the company had, prior to the dividend payment, 
entered into a transaction pursuant to which they thought they could claim for rollover relief. 
Etherton J, relying on Re Lands Allotment Company,44 held that directors were liable to make 
good the money misapplied in breach of trust. The directors’ application under section 727 of the 
Companies Act 198545 failed because the actual advice contemplated certain assumptions 
relating to the transaction which the directors knew were not met and as experienced 
businessmen, they should, but did not, refer the transaction back to the relevant advisers for 
confirmatory advice.46  
 
It is outside the scope of this article to determine whether the strict or fault-based liability 
approach should be preferred in the context of recovery of property improperly paid away. 
Whether or not liability depends on fault, the case law is clear that the company can recover the 
property that is unlawfully transferred and is not the subject of ex turpi causa rule.  
 
B. Case law on recovery of third party losses consequent on criminal conduct 
 
The cases have not allowed the wider form of the ex turpi causa rule to prohibit recovery 
of losses of company which are not fines or legal costs associated with the regulatory 
proceedings. While Belmont Finance and the subsequent cases of financial assistance may be 
justified on the ground that they relate to the capital maintenance rule and the rules exist to 
protect the company, the scope of the public policy bar in a corporate claim against a director 
were subsequently discussed in Bilta v Nazir, a case dealing with the wide version of the rule.47 
In that case, the Court of Appeal, in affirming the decision of the High Court, held that the 
defence of ex turpi causa is not available in a claim by the insolvent company against the 
director (as opposed to an auditor), whose duties included taking into account the interests of 
other persons, including the creditors, and not merely the company. Stone and Rolls was 
distinguished on this basis, and Pattern LJ suggested that Stone and Rolls should be confined to 
its facts. Bilta v Nazir was a company with two directors, one of whom owned all of the shares.  
 
In Brumder v Motornet, it involved a breach of regulation 5 of Provision and Use of 
Work Equipment Regulations 1998. Notwithstanding that it is also a provision which imposes a 
penalty on the company only, the Court of Appeal held that Safeway was not applicable; there 
was no public policy reason to prevent the company from bringing an action against the director 
under section 174 of the Companies Act 2006 who had completely abdicated his responsibility of 
ensuring compliance with the health and safety regulation. Thus, the ex turpi causa rule would 
not apply to the claim by the company against the director in respect of losses incurred by the 
company as a result of being liable to the injured workman.  
 
[Abbey] 
 
C. Rationale for allowing loss shifting by the company to directors/employees for 
property transferred unlawfully 
                                                 
44  [1894] 1 Ch 616. 
45  This is now found in section 1157 of the Companies Act 2006. 
46  [2003] EWHC 999 at [239]. 
47  [2014] 1 Ch 52. 
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Where the company has its assets transferred unlawfully, the company is able to bring an 
action against the directors, on the basis of misfeasance. Further, the company is also able to 
recover from its directors for breach of their duty of care and skill when they commit the 
company to unlawful conduct. At first sight, the difference in outcome between Safeway and 
Brumder appears startling. Assuming that the directors or employees intentionally procure the 
company to enter into the anti-competitive agreements, they would escape liability whereas in 
Brumder, the negligent defendant would in theory be liable for breaching the duty of care in 
ensuring appropriate work and safety matters. However, Part II argues that the cases must be 
viewed in the light of the losses that are proposed to be claimed. There are clear public policy 
reasons against recovery of claims of fines/penalties but not other losses incurred by the 
company by reason of having to compensate third parties or by reason of its property being 
transferred improperly (irrespective of whether there was bad faith involved), even if it can be 
proved that these losses are consequent on criminal conduct.  
 
If the company is held liable to pay damages to a third party, the third party may be at 
risk of not being adequately compensated if the company does not have sufficient funds to 
compensate them. Unlike the payment of fines/penalties where the recovery thereof may create 
moral hazards and lower the deterrence to the wrongdoing company, compensation of third 
parties does not affect deterrence. Hence, there is no reason why the company should not be able 
to recover from its errant directors or employees. Using Kraakman’s model and applying in the 
UK context, one of the three reasons for allowing the liabilities of the enterprise to shift to the 
directors or managers is where the assets of the enterprise are insufficient. These are liabilities 
which they can shift through contract with the company (for example, indemnification for fines 
or liabilities) or through insurance, giving the third party victims of the tort or other wrong a fund 
against which they can claim. 
 
In Safeway, the Court of Appeal has held that the difference between the wide and narrow 
versions of illegality lie in the issue of causation. In the latter case, causation may be difficult to 
prove. This may have been the case in respect of the other kinds of illegality. However, causation 
does not explain the cases of Bilta v Nazir, or Brumder.  
 
D. Scope of prohibition 
 
Once the scope of the prohibition is clarified, two remaining questions arise. First, how 
should costs and expenses of defending the criminal or regulatory proceedings be treated? 
Second, does the prohibition barring claims apply to losses payable by the company as result of 
court-ordered compensation orders which form part of the settlement of the quasi-criminal 
prosecution or deferred prosecution agreement?  
 
1. Recovery of costs and expenses of defence proceedings 
 
In Safeway, the costs and expenses of defence proceedings were treated as falling within 
the wide version of the ex turpi causa rule and were disallowed on the ground. As argued above, 
this part of the ruling is not consistent with the prior case law which has generally permitted 
recovery by the company for losses from a director arising from breach of duty of care and skill 
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or misfeasance, notwithstanding they are consequent upon criminal conduct.  The further 
question then arises is whether these costs and expenses should be recoverable.  
 
It could be argued that recovering these costs and expenses are not inconsistent with the 
legislative purpose behind the imposition of the fine/penalty since the costs are incidental to, and 
are not, the main purpose of deterrence. At common law, 48McGregor suggests that where there 
is mens rea, the fine as well as the costs of the unsuccessful defence cannot be recovered. 
Section 234 of the Companies Act 2006 does not permit indemnification of costs in defending 
criminal proceedings when the outcome is unsuccessful. Thus it is suggested that the outcome of 
the proceedings should be important and that these costs and expenses are not recoverable from 
the directors.  
 
 
 
2. Recovery of court-ordered compensation orders 
 
In principle, once it is accepted the basis of the consistency rationale for prohibiting the 
recovery of fines/penal rests on consistency, there should not be any bar to the recovery of such 
compensation orders, subject to the normal issues of causation.  
 
IV. Inconsistency with Enforcement of Directors’ Duties 
 
A. Australia 
 
Section 180 of the Corporations Act 2001 sets out the statutory duty of the director to 
exercise due care and diligence.49 Breach of section 180 can lead to a civil penalty order,50 a 
disqualification order51 or a compensation order.52 
 
Healey, MacDonald and Fortescue are recent decisions in which the Australian courts 
had to consider the application of section 180 in compliance failures. ASIC has taken “the 
stepping stone” approach to director's duty of care and diligence, by first bringing an action 
against the company for civil penalties in respect of wrongdoing, and upon such finding, 
bringing follow-on actions against the directors for breach of the statutory duty of care. In these 
three cases, the Australian courts have imposed a more stringent standard of care required of 
directors in compliance decisions relating to financial reporting and corporate disclosures, by: (1) 
requiring that the board should be the final gatekeeper in these decisions,53 (2) limiting the ability 
of directors to delegate to or rely on external advisers, officers and fellow directors, and (3) 
disapplying the defence of business judgment. 
 
 
                                                 
48  McGregor, McGregor on Damages (17th edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2003) at [17-050]. 
49  Breach of section 180 can lead to civil sanctions. 
50  Corporations Act, s 1317E. 
51  Corporations Act, s 206C. 
52  Corporations Act, s 1317H. 
53  In Healey, the board was described as the “final filter”, [2011] FCA 717 at [582]. 
 15 
 
SMU Classification: Restricted 
(a) Final gatekeeper 
 
In ASIC, Middleton J held that there was a strict obligation on directors to ensure that the 
provisions in Corporations Act dealing with corporate accounts were considered and applied in 
the proper manner. 54 In that case, there were material errors found in the accounts: the 2007 
annual reports of Centro Properties Group (‘CNP’) and Centro Retail Group (‘CER’) failed to 
disclose significant matters.  In the case of CNP, the report failed to disclose some $1.5 billion of 
short-term liabilities by classifying them as non-current liabilities, and failed to disclose 
guarantees of short-term liabilities of an associated company of about US$1.75 billion that had 
been given after the balance sheet. In the case of CER, the 2007 annual reports failed to disclose 
some $500 million of short-term liabilities that had been classified as non-current. ASIC brought 
enforcement proceedings against the chief executive officer, the chief financial officer and the 
non-executive directors (including the chairman). Middleton J refused to distinguish between the 
roles of the executive and non-executive director and held that there was a “core, irreducible 
requirement of directors to be involved in the management of the company and to take all 
reasonable steps to be in a position to guide and monitor”.55 
 
In ASIC v MacDonald, ASIC brought enforcement proceedings against the directors of a 
company formerly known as James Hardie Industries Ltd, a publicly listed company which was 
historically a manufacturer of asbestos products. ASIC alleged that the board of directors 
(including the executive director and the non-executive directors) breached their duty of care 
when they allowed James Hardie to issue a public announcement regarding a proposed 
restructure of the company which involved the separation of the asbestos liabilities of James 
Hardie from its other operations and the asbestos liabilities were to be managed by a foundation. 
The announcement stated that the foundation would be fully funded to meet the expected 
liabilities, which turned out to be wholly inaccurate. The funding of the trust was determined 
using inadequate actuarial reports and the trust was massively under-funded, leaving victims of 
asbestos liabilities potentially without any remedies.  
 
The case against the directors in James Hardie was that not that the disclosure was 
misleading or that they were involved in misleading conduct; rather it was that they breached of 
section 180 of the Corporations Act 2001 by approving the misleading announcement of James 
Hardie, which was also convicted under sections 1041E and 1041H of the Corporations Act. At 
first instance before Gzell J, the director and all of the non-executive directors were held to have 
breached their duties under section 180. On appeal, the decision was reversed on, among other 
grounds, that ASIC did not prove that the offending announcement was approved by the board 
before its issuance. This finding was reversed on appeal to the High Court, and the decision of 
the first instance judge was upheld. Section 189 was raised but was dismissed as there was no 
evidence of reliance placed by the director. What is significant is that while there is no specific 
reference in the Corporations Act that specifically imposes a duty on the director to assume 
                                                 
54  The director’s obligation, under s 344 of the Corporations Act 2001 is to “take all reasonable steps” to 
comply, or secure compliance, with Pt 2M.3 (which deals with financial reports, directors’ reports, audit, reporting 
to members and lodgement with ASIC).  They are under the same duty with respect to the financial records which 
the entity must keep under Pt 2M.2.  If they fail to take all reasonable steps to comply or secure compliance, they 
contravene the Corporations Act. 
55  At [16]-[17]. 
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responsibility for the disclosure announcement, Gzell J found that such a non-delegable duty 
exists equally for executive and non-executive directors, and matters of approval of such 
significant announcements were not operational matters.  
 
(b) The disapplication of the business judgment rule 
 
Australia has a statutory business judgment rule,56 derived from the concept of the 
business judgment rule under US corporations law.57 While there are restrictions on the 
application of section 180(2),58 the courts in MacDonald and Fortescue have held that disclosure 
issues are not “business judgments”. In Healey, the provision was not even discussed, 
presumably on the ground that the decision on compliance with financial accounts is not 
“business judgment”. These two cases are consistent with the Australian courts’ general refusal 
to allow the directors to undertake a cost-benefit exercise in determining whether the costs of 
compliance exceed the detriment.  
 
In ASIC v Maxwell,59 Brereton J held that it may be breach of a duty for a director to 
embark on or authorise a course of conduct which attracts the risk of the exposure of the 
company to civil penalties or other liabilities under the Corporations Act, at least if the risk is 
clear and the countervailing potential benefits insignificant.60  In a subsequent case of ASIC v 
Cassimati,61 the court played down the reference to the cost-benefit exercise, holding that it was 
against public policy if the directors are allowed to weigh the benefits of deliberately breaching a 
legislative provision versus the penalties that are involved.  
 
(c) Limits on reliance on professional advisers 
 
                                                 
56  Section 180(2) of Australian Corporations Act contains the statutory business judgment rule that provides 
protection for directors in the case of decisions that appeared sound at the time they were made but turned out to be 
bad. For section 180(2) to apply, the director must: (a) make the judgment in good faith for a proper purpose; (b) 
does not have a material personal interest in the subject matter of the judgment; (c) inform themselves about the 
subject matter of the judgment to the extent they reasonably believe to be appropriate; and (d) rationally believe that 
the judgment is in the best interests of the corporation. 
57  See American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations (1992) 
[4.01(c)]. For example, in Delaware law jurisprudence, decisions of the board are subject to the business judgment 
rule, that is, the directors are presumed to have exercised their decision with sound business judgment. Under the 
business judgment rule, the court will presume director independence, disinterestedness on the part of the directors, 
good faith and due care. The burden is on the plaintiff to overturn these presumptions by showing breach of duties of 
loyalty and care. The court will not review the substantive merits of the decisions made by directors. 
58  The conditions that the director must satisfy are: (a) make the judgment in good faith for a proper 
purpose; (b) does not have a material personal interest in the subject matter of the judgment; (c) inform 
themselves about the subject matter of the judgment to the extent they reasonably believe to be appropriate; and 
(d) rationally believe that the judgment is in the best interests of the corporation 
59  (2006) 59 ACSR 373. 
60  ASIC v Maxwell (2006) 59 ACSR 373 at [104]. See also ASIC v Adler (2002) 41 ACSR 72 where the 
relevant companies were found to have breached the provisions on related party transactions in Chapter 2E of the 
corporations Act and the financial assistance provision in section 260A, and Santow J went on to consider whether 
the individual directors had failed to discharge their statutory duty of care.  See also ASIC v Citrofresh International 
Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 27.  
61  [2013] FCA 641. 
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 In this regard, section 189 of the Australian Corporations Act 2002 provides that it is a 
defence to an action under section 180 where directors have relied on professional advice in 
good faith and after making an independent assessment of the information or advice. In Healey, 
according to Middleton J, while directors are entitled to rely on Chief Executive Officer, chief 
financial officer, the independent auditor, the board audit and risk management committees, 
reliance ceases to be reasonable when a director is or should be aware of circumstances which 
would cause a reasonable person to question what he was being told. On the facts, the errors as to 
classification of the debt were so plainly obvious had the directors, who are or should be aware 
of accounting standards. Section 189 was not cited in the judgment. Middleton J rejected the 
view of Rodgers J in Daniels v Anderson62 that reliance on others is only unreasonable if the 
circumstances are so plain, manifest and simple of appreciation that no one with any degree of 
prudence would rely on: 
 
“174      In this proceeding, the directors’ responsibilities and duties were outside 
the realm of operational responsibility… This is not a case concerning the need to verify 
information or scrutinise data of a type outside each director’s own knowledge.  The 
salient feature here is that each director armed with the information available to him was 
expected to focus on matters brought before him and to seriously consider such matters 
and take appropriate action.  This task demands critical and detailed attention, and not 
just ‘going through the motions’ or sole reliance on others, no matter how competent or 
trustworthy they may appear to be. 
175  Directors cannot substitute reliance upon the advice of management for 
their own attention and examination of an important matter that falls specifically within 
the Board’s responsibilities as with the reporting obligations.  The Act places upon the 
Board and each director the specific task of approving the financial statements.  
Consequently, each member of the board was charged with the responsibility of attending 
to and focusing on these accounts and, under these circumstances, could not delegate or 
‘abdicate’ that responsibility to others.” 
 
 Accordingly, it is clear that even in the absence of red flags or evidence of wrongdoing, 
there cannot be unquestioning reliance on management or external auditors by the directors.  
  
 In MacDonald, the defence of the chief executive officer based on reliance on the 
external solicitors who were present at the boardroom when the decision was made to approve 
the misleading announcement failed. The solicitors acted reasonably in the circumstances by 
raising the issue of the reliability of the actuarial reports with the chief executive officer prior to 
the board meeting who assured them that the trust was fully funded. They were not required to 
advise on the issue in relation to the whether the funding was adequate. As such, there was no 
reliance on advice of the external solicitors as to the accuracy of the announcement.  
  
In light of ASIC v Healey and ASIC v Hellicar, the question is whether an English court 
will adopt the Australian position in imposing higher standards on directors, particularly in the 
areas of corporate reporting and corporate disclosure matters.  
                                                 
62  In any event, the Court of Appeal in Daniels v Anderson disagreed with Rodgers J on this issue, stating that 
this statement did not accurately state the extent of the duty of directors in modern company law.  
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It is noted, however, that the enforcement actions are brought by ASIC as the 
securities regulator.  
B. Singapore 
 
[To include] 
  
V. CONCLUSION 
 
It might have been expected that in assessing whether directors have breached their duty 
of care, skill and diligence in respect of corporate compliance failures, such assessment would 
treated in the same way as other commercial decisions of the company. However, this is not in 
fact the case. This article argues that the  
 
